It appears that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi just over a week ago passed with surprisingly little attention from many geopolitical observers. This is striking, because the visit represents one of the most significant recalibrations of India–Russia relations in years, combining expanded defense cooperation, energy assurances, and strong diplomatic symbolism at a time when global alignments are shifting at an unprecedented pace.
At the heart of the visit was the ratification of the Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Support agreement (RELOS), a deal that quietly expands military cooperation between India and Russia to include Russian Arctic ports and the Northern Sea Route (NSR).
The Kola Peninsula in this remote region hosts roughly half of Russia’s nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine fleet, including 12 strategic submarines carrying up to 192 nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, in addition to dozens of other nuclear-powered submarines equipped with cruise missiles and special mission capabilities. In effect, the Arctic functions as Russia’s second-strike nuclear capability in the event that its primary nuclear forces inside its territory were destroyed.
The region is also a key testing ground for advanced weapons systems, including hypersonic missiles, nuclear-powered torpedoes, and cruise missiles. Russia’s state nuclear company Rosatom operates nuclear power facilities in the Arctic as well, further deepening Russia’s nuclear footprint in the region.
Beyond nuclear assets, the Russian Arctic contains some of the world’s largest untapped reserves of oil, gas, and critical minerals. Estimates suggest the region holds more than 35.7 trillion cubic meters of natural gas and over 2.3 billion metric tons of oil and condensates, largely concentrated in the Yamal and Gydan peninsulas south of the Kara Sea. The area also contains vast deposits of nickel, cobalt, and rare earth elements essential to modern industry.
For the Kremlin, exploiting these resources is not merely an economic necessity but a strategic priority, as revenues from Arctic energy projects underpin the financing of Russia’s military modernization and its ability to withstand Western sanctions.
Under the RELOS framework, the armed forces of both countries are permitted to use each other’s bases, ports, and airfields for refueling, repairs, resupply, and maintenance. The agreement also covers joint exercises, training missions, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. However, its strategic implications extend far beyond these formal provisions.
For India, the deal allows its warships to refuel and resupply at Russian ports such as Murmansk and Vladivostok, effectively giving New Delhi a foothold along the Northern Sea Route. This corridor could reduce shipping distances between Europe and Asia by roughly 40%, enhancing both trade efficiency and naval reach.
In practical terms, access to Russian facilities enables Indian forces to sustain forward deployments without relying exclusively on Western partners. Even prior to this agreement, Indian forces participated in Russia-led ZAPAD military exercises between September 12 and 16 alongside Belarus, according to Russia’s state news agency TASS. Those drills reportedly included simulations involving the use of tactical nuclear weapons for the first time.
Symbolically, the RELOS agreement integrates India into Russia’s Arctic project, signaling New Delhi’s entry as a player in Arctic geopolitics and extending its influence into a region long central to Moscow’s strategic ambitions.
On the other side of the equation, reciprocal access to Indian bases and facilities gives Russia a reliable presence in the Indian Ocean, an area where Moscow has long sought to expand its naval footprint but lacked dependable partners. The ability to refuel and repair in Indian ports strengthens Russia’s capacity to project power across the Indo-Pacific and participate more actively in joint military exercises.
Politically, India’s engagement with Russia in the Arctic lends legitimacy to Moscow’s regional ambitions and sends a broader message that the Kremlin is not isolated despite escalating Western sanctions. Closer cooperation with India also opens channels for marketing Arctic hydrocarbons and minerals to Asian buyers, while reinforcing the Northern Sea Route as a future commercial artery for Russia.
From a military standpoint, the agreement deepens offensive and defensive interoperability between the two powers and integrates Russia into India’s broader logistical support network, ensuring greater operational flexibility for Russian naval assets. Strategically, anchoring ties with India helps Moscow counter Western efforts to contain its influence and secures a major Asian partner willing to institutionalize defense cooperation at a time when Russia’s options elsewhere are narrowing.
In the near term, one of the most immediate benefits for Putin may be the implicit reassurance from Modi that the core energy relationship between the two countries remains intact despite mounting Western pressure.
Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, India has emerged as one of the largest buyers of Russian oil, second only to China. In 2024, Russia supplied roughly 36% of India’s total crude imports, or about 1.8 million barrels per day, at prices heavily discounted from global benchmarks.
Despite the United States imposing tariffs of up to 50% on Indian goods to pressure New Delhi into reducing its purchases, India has maintained its reliance on Russian energy, arguing that low-cost supplies are essential for its fast-growing economy. During his December visit, Putin pledged uninterrupted fuel supplies and described Russia as a reliable supplier of oil, gas, and coal.
In response, and after tightening sanctions to discourage India’s use of Russian oil and gas, Washington has recently stepped up its own offers to supply India with energy. These moves are part of a broader push to advance key elements of the “U.S.–India Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership” outlined during meetings between U.S. President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Modi in February.
These plans, mirroring aspects of Russia’s approach toward India, include military components formalized through a new U.S.–India initiative known as COMPACT, short for Catalyzing Opportunities for Military Partnership, Accelerated Commerce, and Technology for the 21st Century. The initiative aims to expand defense sales and co-production to enhance interoperability and industrial defense cooperation.
On the broader trade front, both sides have set a new target of more than doubling bilateral trade to $500 billion by 2030. However, implementing these wide-ranging and interlinked agreements represents Washington’s next major challenge in its effort to keep India aligned with the United States. India’s deep military, political, economic, and energy ties with Russia may prove exceptionally difficult to unwind.
